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FEDERALIST No. 5


  
    
    
    
    
  


















(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)



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To the People of the State of New York:

QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch
Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION
then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention.
I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: "An
entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting
peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove
the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences
betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches,
and trade; and by this union the whole island, being joined in
affection and free from all apprehensions of different interest,
will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES." "We most earnestly
recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty
affair, that the union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being
the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and future happiness,
and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless,
on this occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY
THIS UNION."

It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and divisions
at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would
tend more to secure us from them than union, strength, and good
government within ourselves. This subject is copious and cannot
easily be exhausted.

The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in general
the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons. We may
profit by their experience without paying the price which it cost
them. Although it seems obvious to common sense that the people
of such an island should be but one nation, yet we find that they
were for ages divided into three, and that those three were almost
constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another. Notwithstanding
their true interest with respect to the continental nations was
really the same, yet by the arts and policy and practices of those
nations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually kept inflamed,
and for a long series of years they were far more inconvenient
and troublesome than they were useful and assisting to each other.

Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four
nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies
arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being
"joined in affection" and free from all apprehension of different
"interests," envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence
and affection, and the partial interests of each confederacy,
instead of the general interests of all America, would be the
only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other
BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved in disputes
and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.

The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies cannot
reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an equal
footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form
them so at first; but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what
human contrivance can secure the continuance of such equality?
Independent of those local circumstances which tend to beget and
increase power in one part and to impede its progress in another,
we must advert to the effects of that superior policy and good
management which would probably distinguish the government of
one above the rest, and by which their relative equality in strength
and consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed
that the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight
would uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for
a long succession of years.

Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen
it would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should
rise on the scale of political importance much above the degree
of her neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold her
with envy and with fear. Both those passions would lead them to
countenance, if not to promote, whatever might promise to diminish
her importance; and would also restrain them from measures calculated
to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would not
be necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly dispositions.
She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her neighbors,
but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them. Distrust
naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will and kind
conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies and
uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.

The North is generally the region of strength, and many local
circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the
proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be
unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner
would this become evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite
the same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America
which it formerly did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does
it appear to be a rash conjecture that its young swarms might
often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and
milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors.

They who well consider the history of similar divisions and confederacies
will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in contemplation
would in no other sense be neighbors than as they would be borderers;
that they would neither love nor trust one another, but on the
contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy, and mutual injuries;
in short, that they would place us exactly in the situations in
which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz., FORMIDABLE
ONLY TO EACH OTHER.

From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are
greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive
might be formed between these confederacies, and would produce
that combination and union of wills of arms and of resources,
which would be necessary to put and keep them in a formidable
state of defense against foreign enemies.

When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain
were formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their
forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will
be DISTINCT NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce with
foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions
and commodities are different and proper for different markets,
so would those treaties be essentially different. Different commercial
concerns must create different interests, and of course different
degrees of political attachment to and connection with different
foreign nations. Hence it might and probably would happen that
the foreign nation with whom the SOUTHERN confederacy might be
at war would be the one with whom the NORTHERN confederacy would
be the most desirous of preserving peace and friendship. An alliance
so contrary to their immediate interest would not therefore be
easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be observed and fulfilled
with perfect good faith.

Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring
nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly
passions, would frequently be found taking different sides. Considering
our distance from Europe, it would be more natural for these confederacies
to apprehend danger from one another than from distant nations,
and therefore that each of them should be more desirous to guard
against the others by the aid of foreign alliances, than to guard
against foreign dangers by alliances between themselves. And here
let us not forget how much more easy it is to receive foreign
fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into our country, than
it is to persuade or compel them to depart. How many conquests
did the Romans and others make in the characters of allies, and
what innovations did they under the same character introduce into
the governments of those whom they pretended to protect.

Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into
any given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure
us against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign
nations.